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Eminence at the Bar
At the first session of the Iowa Territorial Su­
preme Court held at Burlington on November 28, 
1838, twenty-eight attorneys were admitted to the 
practice of law. Among them were David Rorer, 
James W. Grimes, S. C. Hastings, T. S. Parvin, 
Ralph P. Lowe, William B. Conway, and Stephen 
Hempstead — all prominent in founding the Com­
monwealth of Iowa. Hastings and Lowe each 
became Chief Justices of the Supreme Court of 
Iowa, and Hastings later served as Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court of California. Conway was 
the first Secretary of the Territory while Parvin 
was the first Territorial Librarian. Hempstead, 
Lowe, and Grimes each served as Governor of 
Iowa, and Grimes became a distinguished member 
of the United States Senate. But for eminence at 
the bar, David Rorer was perhaps the most promi­
nent of them all.
In the first volume of Iowa Supreme Court Re­
ports for the years 1839 to 1846, Rorer appears as 
attorney in thirty-five cases. Some of these cases 
dealt with matters of procedure and technicalities 
of the law, others presented questions of substan­
tive law. Among the legal subjects argued by
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Rorer were contracts, debt, bills and notes, re­
plevin, guardianship, mechanics’ liens, and fugi­
tive slaves. During those years while Iowa was a 
Territory he usually represented his clients alone 
and so he argued against more often than with the 
ablest pioneer attorneys such as James W. Grimes, 
Milton D. Browning, William H. Starr, Stephen 
Whicher, and J. C. Hall.
For three decades after Iowa became a State, 
Rorer continued to appear in important cases be­
fore the Supreme Court. In the cases reported he 
acted as attorney in 128 Supreme Court decisions. 
During the year 1848 alone he argued twenty- 
eight cases before the Supreme Court, and in the 
following year he appeared thirteen times. The 
next highest number of appeals in which he par­
ticipated was ten in 1857. In 1852 and 1859 he 
presented eight cases. During that formative 
period of thirty years there were only three years 
in which he did not appear before the highest 
State court at least once. Most of that time he 
was employed as legal representative of the Bur­
lington railroad, and consequently his practice 
tended to concentrate upon matters pertaining to 
the development of railroad transportation.
But during the earlier years of Rorer’s practice 
in Iowa, he was involved in the three principal 
cases concerning the rights of former slaves. In
EMINENCE AT THE BAR 111
the first, and most famous, he maintained that 
Ralph was a free man because he lived in free ter­
ritory. Nine years later he argued in the Daggs 
case that the State of Iowa was constitutionally 
obligated to enforce the fugitive slave law. And 
in 1855 he successfully defended Dick against the 
charge of being a fugitive slave. His reasoning in 
the Ralph and Daggs cases contributed important 
principles to the jurisprudence of slavery and the 
nature of the Union.
In the year 1834 a slave owner named Mont­
gomery living in Missouri made a written contract 
with his slave, Ralph, whereby it was agreed that 
Ralph should become free in consideration of the 
payment of $550. Moreover, in order that he 
might more readily earn the purchase money, 
Ralph was permitted to leave the State of Mis­
souri and become a resident of that part of the 
Territory of Wisconsin which later became Iowa. 
Ralph obtained work at the Dubuque lead mines, 
but did not save sufficient funds for the payment of 
Montgomery. Later he was seized by agents of 
Montgomery who sought to take him back to Mis­
souri. The captors were intercepted and a writ of 
habeas corpus was issued in behalf of Ralph. The 
case came up for hearing in 1839 as the first case 
tried before the Supreme Court of the Territory of 
Iowa.
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The rights of Ralph were presented by David 
Rorer who contended that Ralph, being a resident 
of the Territory of Iowa in which slavery was pro­
hibited by the act of Congress creating the Terri­
tory, became free by operation of that law. More­
over, he argued that Ralph became free as soon as 
he established residence in Iowa with the consent 
of his master, by virtue of the provisions of the 
Missouri Compromise, which prohibited slavery in 
the territory north of parallel 36° 30', except in the 
State of Missouri. Rorer emphasized the point 
that Ralph was not a fugitive. He had come to 
Iowa by the voluntary consent of his former own­
er. Montgomery, by permitting his slave to go to 
a territory where slavery was prohibited, 1 Virtu­
ally manumitted such slave '. The very act of his 
contracting presupposed a state of freedom on the 
part of the slave. If Montgomery had any right 
of action, it was for the collection of the money 
Ralph had agreed to pay.
Members of the Supreme Court were unani­
mous in supporting these views. Ralph was, there­
fore, discharged and allowed to go free. The facts 
were similar to those later presented in the Dred 
Scott case. But the United States Supreme Court, 
uninfluenced by Rorer’s logic, did not follow the 
Iowa precedent.
In June, 1848, nine Negro slaves — two men,
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three women and four children — escaped from 
the plantation of Ruel Daggs of Clark County, 
Missouri. A little later nine Negroes, presumably 
the same group that had escaped from Daggs, 
were apprehended by two slave hunters, Samuel 
Slaughter and a companion named McClure, in a 
woodland area near the town of Salem, Iowa. Be­
fore the captors could start back to Missouri, 
however, they were confronted by three citizens of 
the Quaker community of Salem — Elihu Frazier, 
Thomas Clarkson Frazier, and Henry Johnson — 
who demanded that the Negroes be taken before 
an officer and the rights of property proven before 
they were taken away. So insistent were the 
Quakers in their demands, that Slaughter and 
McClure were compelled to yield.
At the ensuing trial which was held before 
Nelson Gibbs, a justice of the peace, it appeared 
that the two slave catchers were not personally 
acquainted with the fugitives, and claimed them 
only by the description which had been sent out. 
Accordingly, Justice Gibbs decided that the claim­
ants had proven neither their ownership nor their 
right to detain the Negroes, and that he, as justice 
of the peace, had no authority to hold them. So 
far as he knew they were as free as any other citi­
zens. Thereupon he released them and, with the 
aid of sympathizers, the Negroes escaped.
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In 1850 Daggs brought suit in the Federal 
Court at Burlington against Elihu Frazier and 
others to collect damages for the value of the 
slaves. David Rorer represented the plaintiff in 
this case. In his plea to the jury he emphasized 
the importance of the case, not only to Iowa, but to 
the United States in general. Iowa had recently 
become a State and was therefore obligated to sus­
tain the United States Constitution and the acts of 
Congress, which sanctioned slavery. To hold 
slaves was the privilege of the citizens of Missouri. 
Negro slaves were property, the same as horses or 
oxen, and the owner had a right to claim his prop­
erty wherever he found it. Any person who pre­
vented him from exercising this right was held 
liable to the owner for the damages done.
“The guilty deserve to be punished“, declared 
Rorer, “and the injured are entitled to redress. 
Above all, the law should be vindicated — its su­
premacy confirmed. The idea that any man or 
society of men may be permitted to trample upon 
the plain letter of the law and constitution should 
be severely rebuked, and the offenders convinced 
that the impunity they have enjoyed in other places 
will never be found in Iowa.“
In defense of the Quakers of Salem, }. C. Hall 
contended that property rights were within the 
jurisdiction of the State. In Iowa Negro slaves
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were not recognized as property. Therefore, the 
citizens of Salem might give aid to needy human 
beings without incurring liability, unless it was 
clearly shown that they were aiding fugitive 
slaves. The escape of nine persons in one area and 
the finding of nine persons in another locality was 
not evidence of identity.
Despite the able arguments of Hall, the “silver 
tongued Rorer” convinced the jury that the Ne­
groes were fugitive slaves and that Frazier and 
his friends had aided in their escape. Accordingly, 
a judgment for $2900 damages was assessed 
against the defendants.
The question of identity was the principal issue 
in the Dick case. Dr. Edwin James, who was 
known to be an abolitionist and a “station master“ 
on the Underground Railroad, drove into Burling­
ton in the forenoon of June 23, 1855. With him in 
the farm wagon was a Negro named Dick. 
Earlier in the morning they had crossed the Mis­
sissippi River on a ferry to the end of the railroad 
opposite the city. There the Negro was “pounced 
upon by two Missouri man-hunters, armed with 
pistols and bowie knives,“ who alleged that Dick 
was the slave of Rutherford in Clark County, 
Missouri. They demanded that he should be sur­
rendered to them as Rutherford’s agents. Dr. 
James and Dick recrossed the river to Burlington,
282 THE PALIMPSEST
where the agents sought to establish their claim by 
legal process. A complaint signed by William C. 
Young was filed with Magistrate George Frazee 
who issued a warrant as required by law where­
upon Dick was arrested and held for trial as a 
fugitive slave.
Meanwhile, several prominent citizens of Iowa 
had become interested in the case. Elaborate 
plans were made to defend the Negro against the 
slave catchers who, it appeared, had never seen 
Rutherford’s slave whom they sought. At the 
trial David Rorer and T. D. Crocker appeared in 
behalf of Dick, while Milton D. Browning repre­
sented the claimant. Young Rutherford, a son of 
the claimant and one who was supposed to be well 
acquainted with his father’s slaves, was present. 
In the crowded court room every one ‘ was agog 
to see the witness upon whose testimony the fate 
of Dick depended.” Even the ladies, of whom a 
considerable number were present, seemed anxious 
to know how a man looked who was willing to 
consign the poor fugitive to life-long servitude. 
Rutherford took the witness stand and Dick was 
requested to stand up, so that the witness might 
identify him. Much to the surprise of everybody, 
including the judge and attorneys on both sides, 
young Rutherford promptly stated that the Negro 
before him was not the one whom he sought, that
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he did not know this man, and that he had never 
seen him before.
No other evidence was offered. Upon motion 
by Rorer the court ordered that Dick should be 
released from custody and whatever property had 
been taken from him should be restored. It is re­
ported that “more than a thousand exulting people 
escorted Dick to the ferry-boat on which Dr. 
James, Dick, and plenty of guards crossed the 
river, and this time Dick was started by rail to­
wards Chicago without detention.”
As one of the organizers of the Burlington and 
Missouri River Railroad Company in 1852, Rorer 
became interested in the law pertaining to the 
rights and obligations of such corporations. His 
practice became more and more concentrated upon 
railroad cases. Being employed continuously as 
solicitor for the Burlington and Missouri River 
Railroad and its successor, the Chicago, Burling­
ton and Quincy, he naturally devoted much atten­
tion to the legal problems involved in the sale of 
stock, the acquisition of the right-of-way, and the 
settlement of damage suits. Many of the early 
disputes were intrinsically trivial, but the prece­
dents established were important. The develop­
ment of the law interested Rorer.
Between 1855 and 1876 David Rorer appealed 
twenty-four cases to the Supreme Court of Iowa
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on behalf of the railroad. Of these he won thirteen 
and lost eleven. If these instances are representa­
tive of the litigation in which he participated, the 
range of issues was wide and technical.
The first time Rorer appeared before the Su­
preme Court for the railroad was in 1855 when a 
citizen named Sater refused to grant right-of-way 
to the company for the assessed damages. Sater 
took his claim to court, but before the dispute came 
to trial the railroad company proposed to dismiss 
the suit and abandon all claim to the right-of-way. 
To this Sater objected and the district court sus­
tained his claim to collect damages. Before the 
Supreme Court, Rorer argued that the railroad 
company had not yet acquired any right to the 
property, that Sater had sustained no damage, that 
the company was free to select a different route, 
and that the suit to settle damage claims under the 
eminent domain statute could be dismissed without 
injury to the property owner. This view was up­
held.
There must have been many damage suits 
against the railroad, for several were appealed to 
the Supreme Court. In two instances claims were 
made for the value of cattle that were killed on the 
tracks. In one case a passenger claimed damages 
for baggage that was stolen in transit. Citizens of 
Burlington sought damages because their brewery
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burned. Originally the building fronted on the 
river with only a street between. But the Burling­
ton and Missouri River Railroad Company had 
filled in along the shore and built tracks between 
the street and the river so that there was no access 
to the stream. Firemen could not reach the river 
“by reason of the use of the street and embank­
ment by the railway company“ and so property 
worth $22,000 was destroyed. But Rorer was 
able to convince the Supreme Court that the loca­
tion of the tracks had too remote a connection with 
the fire to be a cause for claiming damages.
To encourage the construction of railroads, 
cities and counties often borrowed money to buy 
stock in companies that promised to provide rail 
transportation for the community. Years of litiga­
tion in State and Federal courts were consumed in 
establishing the legality of such subsidies. The 
last time Rorer appeared before the Supreme 
Court, in 1876, he won a decision for the railroad 
in a dispute which originated in a transaction to 
which he had been a party as attorney for the com­
pany when the railroad was being built.
The voters of Wapello County in 1853 ap­
proved of subscribing $100,000 for capital stock 
of the Burlington and Missouri River Railroad to 
be paid in county bonds issued in twenty monthly 
installments of $5000 each. The first six install-
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ments were issued and delivered to the company 
at Ottumwa in the presence of Rorer on January 
12, 1855, but thereafter the county refused to issue 
any more bonds for the railroad. Indeed, Wapello 
County obtained a ruling by the Iowa Supreme 
Court in 1862 that counties had no authority to 
subscribe for railroad stock, which nullified the 
whole contract. This decision was later overruled 
by the United States Supreme Court. But Wap­
ello County never paid the remainder of the sub­
scription approved by the voters in 1853.
Years later, in 1869, Wapello County sued the 
railroad to obtain stock certificates for the $30,000 
paid in bonds. These bonds, sold in the meantime 
by the railroad, constituted a legal liability of the 
county. The district court in Ottumwa decided in 
favor of the county, but Rorer appealed for the 
railroad and persuaded the Supreme Court that 
Wapello County had violated the original contract 
by failing to pay the full subscription and there­
fore forfeited the bonds that were delivered.
David Rorer took a scholarly attitude toward 
the law. He read widely in the preparation of his 
briefs, and his experience as an advocate led to 
more thorough study of certain branches of the 
law. In order to make his knowledge available to 
other members of the profession, he decided to 
write some books.
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His first volume, The Law of Judicial and Exe- 
cution Sales, was published in 1873. In the pref­
ace he explained that the policy in the United 
States, “unlike that of England, has everywhere 
encouraged the distribution of landed property, 
not only by rendering it liable to change of owner­
ship in fee, by ordinary bargain and sale, but also 
by sales on writ of execution, and on decrees of 
the courts. Hence, much of the landed wealth of 
the country is held or claimed under titles and 
sales made by coercion of law.” He ventured to 
hope that his book might “meet from the courts 
and lawyers a favorable reception.”
Fortunately this hope was not in vain. Five 
years later, in 1878, in preparing a revised edition, 
Rorer said: “The favorable reception by the
courts and the legal profession of the original edi­
tion of this work, encourages the author to lay 
before them a second edition, greatly enlarged, 
and so re-arranged as to afford a more ready 
reference to the contents.” This volume in its re­
vised form contained 612 pages.
The regulation of the rapidly growing railroads 
after the Civil War created as many legal prob­
lems as political issues. Rorers work as solicitor 
for the Burlington railroad required careful atten­
tion to the legislative authority of the States. His 
second book, American Inter-State Law, published
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in 1879, was a pioneer work on the States ‘in their 
dealings and relations with each other, as well as 
with the national government.” The subject, he 
said, must be clearly distinguished from that of 
international law.
Both his practice and his research culminated in 
Rorer’s monumental two-volume Treatise on the 
Law of Railways, published in the last year of his 
life, 1884. “The approbation accorded by the 
courts and bar,” to his previous works, he wrote 
in the preface, “encourages the author now, to 
offer them” this product of his experience, “hoping 
it may prove useful and meet with a like indul­
gence.” He must have been pleased to know that 
his writings were used as textbooks in various 
colleges of law.
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